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Abstract
Objectives Clinical judgment is a central element of the medical profession, essential for
the performance of the doctor, and potentially generating information also for other clini-
cians and for scientists and health care managers. The recently renewed interest in clinical
judgement is primarily engaged with its role in communication, diagnosis and decision
making. Beyond this issue, the present article highlights the interrelations between clinical
judgement, therapy assessment and medical professionalism.
Methods Literature review and theory development.
Results The article presents different methodological approaches to causality assessment
in clinical studies and in clinical judgement, and offers criteria for clinical single case
causality. The article outlines models of medical professionalism such as technical ratio-
nality and practice epistemology, and characterizes features of professional expertise such
as tacit knowledge, reﬂection in action, and gestalt cognition.
Conclusions Consequences of a methodological and logistical advancement of clinical
judgment are discussed, both in regard to medical progress and to the renewel of the
cognitive basis of the medical profession.
Introduction
The medical profession is ‘a vocation in which a doctor’s knowl-
edge, clinical skills, and judgement are put in the service of pro-
tecting and restoring human well-being’ [1]. A basis of this
profession is clinical judgement. It lies at the heart of the doctor’s
connoisseurship, expertise and skills, being ‘almost as important
as the technical ability to carry out the procedure itself’[2]. Clini-
cal judgement is developed through practice, experience, knowl-
edge and continuous critical analysis. It extends into all medical
areas: diagnosis, therapy, communication and decision making.
However, there are also other views on clinical judgment which
disregard it as notoriously fallacious, as an unfathomable and
irrational black box: ‘a smokescreen for not having read this
week’s NEJM or Lancet’ [3–5].
During recent years, there has been a newly arising interest in
this topic, and there has been an array of investigations on clinical
judgement. They were, however, mainly restricted to the role of
clinical judgement in communication, diagnosis and decision
making [6–10], not taking into consideration its capacities for
therapy assessment: its potential competence and validity, its sus-
ceptibility to error and bias, and the question of whether it could
possibly be optimized and professionalized. The present article
enters into this issue and highlights the interrelations of clinical
judgement, therapy assessment, and medical professionalism.
Clinical judgement and positivistic
therapy assessment
The reputation of clinical judgement underwent substantial trans-
formation during the last century. Initially, the clinically skilled
and scientiﬁcally competent doctors and their judgements were the
main impetus for treatment decision, therapy assessment and
medical progress. With the rise of modern research methodology,
however, the fallacious aspects of clinical judgement were increas-
ingly emphasized. It was presumed that personal judgement would
be unable to go beyond a simple post hoc ergo propter hoc, and
could at best accomplish something like simple, intuitive, low-
quality correlational statistics [11,12].Aprimary mission therefore
became ‘to guard against any use of judgement’ [13], and it was
executed through clinical trials. Yet this general discredit of per-
sonal judgement was not based on systematic investigations, but
on anecdotal examples of naivety and error and on the general low
esteem of personal cognition in the times of neopositivist [14] and
fallibilist [15] epistemologies.
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with the causality question of whether the outcome is causally
connected to the treatment manoeuvre. For the assessment of such
therapeutic causality, the randomized controlled trial (RCT) has
become the gold standard. The RCT incorporates paradigms of
famous philosophers and methodologists who claimed causality
assessment to be valid and reliable only on the basis of: experiment
(Francis Bacon, 17th Century) [16], many repeated observations
(David Hume, 18th Century) [17], comparison (John S. Mill, 19th
Century) [18], randomization (Ronald Fisher, 20th century) [19].
Today’s medical methodology is outlined accordingly: the assess-
ment of therapeutic causality is claimed to require an interven-
tional study (=experiment) of a cohort (=many repeated
observations), with a control group (=comparison), and with
random allocation of patients to the intervention or the control
group (=randomization).
Particularly important in the canon of these paradigms is
Hume’s seminal position that causality assessment requires
repeated observations, and is not possible in single cases. Conse-
quently, even when randomization cannot be set up, clinical epi-
demiology asks at least for a group comparison [20,21].
Accordingly, if an individual doctor wants to judge a therapeutic
effect, he/she will have to treat many patients with the respective
therapyandtreatmanyotherpatientswithadifferent(orno)therapy
and gain a sense of the average outcomes in both groups as well
as of their difference – while taking into account spontaneous
variations and effects of prognostic factors, adjunctive therapies,
contextfactors,etc.Thiskindofjudgementisobviouslybeyondthe
capacity of the singular practitioner. Not surprisingly, the classic
article on evidence-based medicine [22] restricts clinical expertise
to diagnosis and to identiﬁcation of the patient’s perspective, and
does not include judgement about the effects of care. Concerning
therapeutic effectiveness, the doctor seems to be totally dependent
on external evidence. Seen from this perspective, reliable personal
judgement, experience and expertise appear to be a self-delusion.
Technical Rationality – epistemology
of practice
The corresponding model of professionalism is Technical Ratio-
nality (the Positivist epistemology of practice), conceiving intelli-
gent practice as application of external science: the practitioner
hands his problem over to the external scientist, who, after having
solved the problem, returns scientiﬁc knowledge and scientiﬁc
directions to practice [23]. Indeed, many modern therapies come
from the realm of external science: developed by pharmaceutical
industries, tested by epidemiologists and statisticians, licensed by
agencies, assessed in reviews and Health TechnologyAssessment-
reports, directed through guidelines. For the practicing doctor, all
which remains is to clarify whether his/her patient matches with
the inclusion criteria of the respective ‘best evidence study’, and
whether the therapy matches his/her patient’s life perspectives.
The doctors themself are needed only for the transmission of the
scientiﬁc results to the singular patient, with little necessity for
their own clinical judgement.
What are the consequences?The model ofTechnical Rationality
shifts emphasis from the patient–doctor relationship, centred on
individual help, to the client–provider contract, centred on the
application of certiﬁed health technologies. The practical realiza-
tion of this model, together with economic restrictions and liability
issues, leads to extensive external regulation of the doctor’s activi-
ties, to diminishing autonomy, deprofessionalization, proletarian-
ization and over-management of medicine. Consequences are an
overwhelming bureaucratic work load, restricted expert perfor-
mance, and minimized time for the individual patient [23,24]. In
many countries, doctors feel utterly demoralized by their situation
[25].
Still, in contrast to the positivists’ theory and ideal of Technical
Rationality, the practice of the medical profession has often been
described as a combination of practical science and artistry, with
its own characteristic features, distinct from those of natural or
theoretical sciences [23,24,26,27]. The model of Technical Ratio-
nality has been shown to be grossly oversimpliﬁed and applicable
only to simple, repetitive and novices’ situations, but not to the
complexity which generally characterizes real-life professionalism
[23,26]. For a more elaborate epistemology of professional prac-
tice several further traits, in addition to external knowledge, are
characteristic – tacit knowledge, reﬂection in action and Gestalt
cognition [23,26,28–30].
Tacit knowledge (implicit knowledge) generally constitutes
much of expert knowledge. Experienced and competent profes-
sionals do not only rely on explicit factual knowledge but also on
tacit knowledge [23,26,28,31,32]. The competent practitioner
‘makes innumerable judgements of quality for which he cannot
state adequate criteria, and he displays skills for which he cannot
state the rules and procedures....h ei sdependent on tacit recog-
nitions, judgements, and skillful performances.’ [23] Practitioners
know more than they can say, and it is the tacit knowledge which
distinguishes the master from the apprentice. Most obviously, tacit
knowledge is present in outstanding musicians, athletes or chess
players. Tacit knowledge shows a higher correlation to profes-
sional success than conventional intelligence [26,29]. When
experts try to follow the demand for rationalization, and to ﬁnd
elements and rules for their performance, they easily regress to the
level of a novice [28,29,33,34]. Experts’ knowledge with its strik-
ing ﬂexibility, sensitivity to context and individual orientation
cannot be replaced by formalization [26]. This also applies to
scientiﬁc discovery: the abilities to see a problem, to anticipate the
unknown, and to ﬁnd a new route to insight and knowledge are all
based on tacit dimensions [30].
Reﬂection in action becomes relevant when the practitioner
deals with a situation of uncertainty, instability, uniqueness and
conﬂicting values. When confronted with problems for which
explicit guidelines or implicit knowledge are insufﬁcient, or when
spontaneous performances yield unexpected results, the practitio-
ners can become researchers in their own practice. They enter into
a reﬂective conversation with the situation in order to a ﬁnd solu-
tion. Open for the discovery of new phenomena, they become
artistic and creative, and can eventually produce new insight and
knowledge. Through reﬂection, they can also surface and criticize
the tacit understandings that have evolved around repetitive obser-
vations and around guidelines. In this way, reﬂection can serve as
a corrective to overlearning [23,26].
Gestalt cognition assesses the wholeness of a pattern (or a
substance, or a meaning) that is irreducible to its parts and con-
ceivable independent from its particulars [35–37]. While stochas-
tic approaches assess correlations, Gestalt-oriented approaches
assess patterns. Personal experience can transform into Gestalt
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can eventually be manifested even in the tacit power of the scien-
tiﬁc or artistic genius [30]. It is this capacity for Gestalt cognition
which enables the expert’s connoisseurship, that is, his exceptional
ability to swiftly interpret situations and to exhibit outstanding
performances [26,29,38]. Gestalt cognition also promotes the
capacities for reﬂection in action.
An important question now is whether these features of profes-
sionalism are of any relevance to the judgement of therapy effects.
The answer must be deﬁnitely negative, that is, as long as David
Hume’s dictum is held to be true: as long as single case causality
assessment is considered as principally impossible.Yet, the school
of Gestalt theory [39], and also other epistemologists [40–42],
raised opposition against Hume’s doctrine and pointed at novel
ways to causality recognition which are also relevant for medicine.
Gestalt cognition in the judgement of
therapy effects
Karl Duncker, in an essay on productive thinking [43], demon-
strated with everyday examples that certain cause–effect relations
can be assessed in single case situations – when the Gestalt
(feature, pattern, substance) of the cause stretches into the Gestalt
of the effect and can be perceived there. Simple examples are: the
wetness of the rain causes the wetness of the street; the sequence
of the trumpet sounds cause the rhythm and melody of the echo.
Both examples offer certainty about the causal relation even in the
mere singular case: the rain example, because the substance of
the cause (wetness, water) continues into, or is identical with, the
substance of the effect; and the trumpet example, because the
pattern of the trumpet sounds (rhythm, melody) is actively trig-
gered by the trumpeter himself and reappears in the pattern of the
echo.
Altogether there are three levels of valid causality assessment:
[44] (1) When, as in the rain example, a Gestalt unity of cause and
effect can be apprehended, one can be certain about the cause–
effect relation even without experimental activity. (2) When, as in
the trumpet example, there is no unity but a Gestalt correspon-
dence between cause and effect, one can also be certain about
causality, but only when the cause is triggered through intentional
activity. (3) When there is neither a Gestalt unity nor a Gestalt
correspondence, one needs intentional activity in two instances: in
triggering the cause and in controlling the conditions under which
the effect is being observed, that is, one needs to do a controlled
trial, an RCT.
In medicine, indeed, one can ﬁnd many examples not only for
level 3, but also for level 1 and 2 assessment: Gestalt unities, for
example, when an implanted prosthesis becomes a new wall of a
ruptured aorta and thus prevents further extravasation [45]; and
Gestalt correspondences, when one has examples such as the
following ones. Time-correspondence: when an uncontrollable
postpartum bleeding because of placenta accreta ceases
immediately after vasopressin inﬁltration [46]. Time-pattern-
correspondence: when a persistent hiccup stops on day 8 exactly
when the patient smokes marijuana, recurs on day 9, and again
disappears (persistently) on day 10 right after marijuana is
being smoked once more [47]. (The design of conventional
N-of-1-studies follows such time patterns.) Space-pattern-
correspondence: when 24 hours after intracutaneous injections of
Botulinum toxin at ten different sites of a chronically hyper-
hidrotic palm, there were corresponding anhidrotic areas growing
exactly around the ten injection sites, ﬁnally ﬂowing together and
thus creating a persistent total anhidrosis [48]. Morphological-
correspondence: when conduct anaesthesia creates an anaesthe-
tized area corresponding with the innervation area of the blocked
nerve; or when external ﬁbers of the nerve are blocked ﬁrst and
when correspondingly the onset of anaesthesia starts proximal,
spreading to distant areas only later on [49]. Dose–effect-
correspondence: when catatonia ratings in a woman with schizoaf-
fective disorder improve in direct correspondence with zolpidem
plasma concentrations [50]. Dialogual-correspondence: when a
5-year-old autistic boy, who had never spoken a word but only
screamed chaotically all his life, is brought to interactive Nordoff–
Robbins music therapy, and when he increasingly echoes a variety
of musical elements presented by the piano therapist, until he also
echoes sung words and thus develops a growing vocabulary [51].
Parallel-test-result-correspondence: when the infection in a
woman’s swollen and deeply blue ﬁnger, having been bitten by a
swan, was ﬁrst unsuccessfully treated with oral cephradine, and
then, after the wound swab culture had demonstrated a Pseudomo-
nas aeruginosa resistant against cephradine but sensitive to cipro-
ﬂoxacin, was treated with ciproﬂoxacin and was rapidly healed
[52]. Complex-prediction-and-observation-correspondence: when
chronic anal ﬁssures with sustained internal sphincter hypertonia
[53] and subsequent reduced perfusion of the posterior midline
anoderm [54] are interpreted as ischemic ulcers [55], and when
therefore the external application of isosorbide dinitrate is
expected to provoke a sequential process as follows: ﬁrst a reduc-
tion of anal pressure, second an increased perfusion, third a reduc-
tion of ﬁssure related pain, fourth a healing of ﬁssure – and when
exactly this sequence is observed [56].
Clinical practice is full of such cases, partly trivial, partly exotic.
Their common feature is not eminent effect size, but the Gestalt-
based approach to therapeutic causality. Such cases do not only
deal with short term effects, but also with their long-term continu-
ations [44]. Such cases demonstrate that – in principle, when
Gestalt-criteria are accessible – clinical judgement can reach
beyond simple post hoc ergo propter hoc. Combinations of differ-
ent Gestalt-elements even allow subtle and sophisticated judge-
ments, and through integrating repeated case judgements one can
build up valid experience.
Based on single case causality assessment one can produce
internal evidence (personal judgement, experience, expertise) as
well as external evidence (case reports and case series in which the
respective Gestalt criteria are explicitly taken into account). The
explication of the Gestalt-criteria raises this kind of causality
assessment above mere implicitness, and extricates the case
reports and case series from their traditional low evidence level.
Of course, protection against error must be given consideration.
As is necessary in all ﬁelds of enquiry, it is important to observe
and exercise the following criteria: self-critical attitude; compre-
hensive and clear observation; assemblage of the essential details;
analysis of well-known factors of misperception [57]; reﬂective
explication of the judgement criteria; and, as far as possible,
communication with colleagues, or a publication and a critical
appraisal by the medical community.
Notably, the individual clinician can replicate or revise the
therapeutic observations of his/her fellow colleagues, whereas
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randomized routine patient care – have to be followed blindly.
Two approaches
The three levels of causality recognition (see above) imply two
different kinds of approaches to therapy assessment: one based on
cohort comparison and ultimately demanding RCT technology;
and one based on case analysis and ultimately requiring Gestalt
criteria. The ﬁrst approach can assess, on cohort level, the superi-
ority of one treatment compared to another but cannot evaluate
treatment effects in individual patients. The second approach can
assess individual effectiveness but cannot determine general
superiority.
The ﬁrst approach – with the RCTas gold standard – is currently
given priority in clinical research. RCTs make essential contribu-
tions to patient care and constitute an indispensable feature of
medical professionalism. Nevertheless, the RCT has its limita-
tions: it cannot be conducted by an individual doctor who wants to
investigate therapeutic procedures on his own initiative; impedi-
ments are the logistic and bureaucratic complexity, extensive regu-
lations, and the excessive costs that require a powerful ﬁnancial
backing [58]. An RCT can only be conducted under restricted
circumstances: when the respective disease is sufﬁciently frequent,
so that enough patients can be recruitedt [59,60]; when neither the
test or control therapy is strongly preferred [61]; and when both
therapies seem to be similarly successful (equipoise) [62]. The
RCTs usually do not assess treatments in the daily clinical routine
situation [60,63] (but often evaluate substantially different modali-
ties of intervention, also co-interventions, treatment setting, length
of treatment and follow-up, patients characteristics, diagnostic
procedures, outcome measure, etc [60,63,64]. Furthermore, RCTs
seem inappropriate for complex and skill-dependent treatments
and can systematically distort their evaluation [65], and ﬁnally, the
cost of the studies (average costs per RCT with public health
relevance are estimated at 12 million US dollars [66]) leads to a
commercial bias by privileging patentable treatments from the
pharmaceutical industry for large patient populations. Disadvan-
taged, on the other hand, are non-proﬁt or low-proﬁt treatments,
non-patentable drugs, and non-pharmacological treatments like
surgical procedures, educational and lifestyle interventions, diet,
weight-loss programmes, exercise, physiotherapy, sanitation,
treatments for neglected diseases, for children, for maternal health,
antidotes for poisoning, rare diseases, etc.
The second approach, with Gestalt-oriented therapeutic causal-
ity assessment, also has speciﬁc limitations. It is only applicable
when Gestalt criteria are accessible. How often this occurs in
clinical practice is not known at present.Avague orientation might
be supplied by a retrospective analysis of 122 consecutive general
practice interventions.Atotal of 82 treatment cases were ‘evidence
based’but, quite remarkable, 51 of these were based on ‘convinc-
ing non-experimental evidence’ [67]. As a consequence, the
authors of this analysis demanded ‘an appropriate paradigm of
evidence based practice rather than that determined solely by
clinical trials’: ‘We believe that for general practice, and possibly
in other settings too, the most important evidence may be found in
developing alternative methodologies which complement conclu-
sions from randomized controlled trials.’ Gestalt-based therapy
assessment might be one of these methodologies.
The primary importance of Gestalt-oriented assessments lies in
clinical situations in which the question of individual effectiveness
is predominant: when clinicians are gaining new insights in their
practice (‘reﬂection in action’); when individual tailoring of treat-
ment is necessary (e.g. pain treatment, complex interventions,
certain surgical procedures, physiotherapy); when positively RCT-
tested treatments are absent, or insufﬁcient, or without beneﬁt for
the individual patient (for positive RCTresults the ‘number needed
to treat’usually lies between 2 and 100, i.e. 50–99% of patients do
not beneﬁt from the respective treatment [68]); when responders
and non-responders have to be identiﬁed; or when unexpected
potential side effects are observed. In clinical practice, the indi-
vidual effectiveness of a treatment for the particular patient is more
important than the (usually small [59]) superiority on cohort level,
which is the predominant question of a comparative trial. The
more skill-based a therapy – that is, the more the therapy is an
inherent part of treatment actions that depend on personal abilities
– the less relevant it is to know the comparative efﬁcacy as such,
and the more important the matters of clinical judgement can
become.
An open question, both for RCTs and case studies, is the topic of
generalization. Unless the RCT samples and the case patients are
randomly selected from the target population (which they almost
never are) and unless all treated patients are responders (number
needed to treat = 1) or response criteria are fully transparent, there
will always be substantial indeterminacy as far as generalization
is concerned [68]. Generalization will seem more legitimate when
based on cohorts than only on cases. However, a series of con-
secutive cases is also a cohort, and it already includes replications.
Medical innovation
Clinical reasearch has lead to a substantial improvement of medi-
cine. Still, a renaissance of clincial judgement – critically based on
gestalt criteria – could offer a methodological expansion for the
ﬁeld of professional therapy assessment. Not only clinical practice
could beneﬁt from it, but also clinical research and medical inno-
vation. After the golden ages between 1930 and 1965, when
seminal discoveries irrevocably changed medicine, the rate of
remedial innovation has continuously declined despite billions of
dollars invested [69]. The great discoveries were made by inge-
nious pioneering individuals who combined basic science and
passionate clinical work: driven by the desire to cure patients,
guided by scientiﬁc thinking; open to the unexpected, and little
hampered by bureaucracy and costs. For their discoveries, clinical
judgement was indispensable. Relying on small sample sizes and
discarding therapies unless there were obvious effects in 10–20
patients, they found spectacular results and thus expedited inno-
vation. Effects that could only be seen in large trials were regarded
as not worth bothering about. The spectacular, ground-breaking
discoveries such as sulphonamids, penicillin, cephalosporins, neu-
roleptics, antidepressants, steroids, etc. would possibly not have
been made within the requirements of modern research bureau-
cracy [59,70].
Since then, the increase of administrative burden, negative atti-
tudes towards the innovative clinician, and astronomical research
costs forced large sections of treatment development to shift from
the patient-oriented doctor to patent-oriented industry [69,70].
Given the present conditions, future therapy developments are
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without patent protection. However, industrialized drug develop-
ment is regarded as inefﬁcient: dominated by marketing research,
mass procedures, and by techniques like screening, computerized
drug design, and genomics – instead of putting most emphasis on
the creative, ingenious individuals with broad knowledge of medi-
cine and biology [71,72]. The primary goal is large sales, and the
bizarre culmination of this goal is to design drugs for healthy
people that ‘sell to everyone’ [73]. For most diseases, however,
therapeutic progress is pathetic. The less lucrative a disease, the
more is it neglected.
The other side of the same coin is visible in clinical medicine
where the spirit of innovation has been exorcised. Rigid regula-
tions, endless documentation and rapid throughput of patients
allow little time for the contemplation of clinical problems. Clini-
cal thinking and clinical judgement have come into seeming con-
ﬂict with efﬁciency and economics. Discoveries and innovations
by clinicians (‘the spirited pursuit of the unknown – so long a
deﬁning quality of medicine’[74]) are being discouraged and have
fallen into disrepute. The brightest and most imaginative individu-
als, once attracted by clinical medicine, head to other disciplines,
while those who stay risk becoming stultiﬁed by repetitious
routine. A tragedy, because ‘clinical champions’ would have the
skills and scientiﬁc background for relevant observations and new
medical insights, would be able to identify critical questions and
seek satisfying solutions [74].
Consequences for the
medical profession
Traditional medical methodology does not sufﬁciently reﬂect the
necessities and possibilities of individual effectiveness assess-
ment. As a consequence, clinical judgement is considered the
non-objectiﬁable part of medicine, allowed to pursue a merciful
existence ‘in the darkness of the doctor-patient relationship’ [75].
Similarly, case reports and case series, though on the other hand
often designated as ‘cornerstones of medical progress’ [76], are
considered as the lowest level of evidence: ‘the least-publishable
unit in medical literature’ [77]. Thus, in the shadow of these
preconditions and premises, individual clinical judgement and
clinical expertise have remained a blind spot in modern medicine.
Investigating the principles and criteria of individual causality
assessment could shed some light into this darkness. When taking
notice of the full scope of causality assessment – not only of
the RCT-dominated level 3, but also of the Gestalt-oriented
approaches of level 1 and 2 – one could bridge the two otherwise
incommensurable worlds of medical professionalism: the realm of
technical rationality that is based on external evidence; and the
realm of practice-innate rationality that is born out of observation,
reasoning, tacit knowledge and reﬂection in action.
During the second half of the 20th Century, medical profession-
alism beneﬁted from the evolution of external evidence, with the
RCT as gold standard. A consequential new step would be to
additionallyevolvethemethodologyofclinicaljudgement,andthe
potentials for internal evidence. To this purpose, the Gestalt-
oriented methodology of individual effectiveness assessment has
to be further investigated, the criteria of valid judgement have to be
established, and a methodically reshaped clinical judgement has to
be newly implemented into all levels of medicine: into individual
therapy situations, daily communication, journal publications, and
general health care decisions. Moreover, in medical education, not
only statistics should be taught, but also the epistemology of clini-
cal judgement.
It is also necessary to reverse the exodus of research-oriented
clinicians and clinically oriented basic scientists [69]. Novelty and
originality, imagination and inquisitive thinking – all this needs to
be cultivated, not penalized. More advantage should be taken of
the experiential knowledge of clinicians. Dealing with suffering
patients every day, making important observations regarding
illness, interventions and patients needs, the clinicians can observe
practical consequences of therapeutic applications and of health
care directions given to them by the knowledge-creating institu-
tions. ‘In caring for patients, clinicians constantly perform experi-
ments. During a single week of active practice, a busy clinician
conducts more experiments than most of his laboratory colleagues
do in a year.’ [78] These observations, however, have little inﬂu-
ence backwards on the more general levels. To take advantage of
this resource, methods and logistics should be developed for skim-
ming off the knowledge pool that is build up through the clini-
cians’ daily experience. Systems for accessing high-quality
judgements need to be created.
The clinicians should again be enabled to participate autono-
mously in clinical research. Institutional and ﬁnancial barriers
should be reduced, and many more small trials should be con-
ducted, particularly on concepts and products that are not sup-
ported by the pharmaceutical industry. Being unafraid of small
studies looking for large effects, rather than conducting large trials
looking for small effects, might well accelerate medical progress
[69]. Furthermore, analysing and publishing clinical judgements
of highly skilled and ingenious clinicians could profoundly con-
tribute to medical progress and education.
One may also have to introduce something that actually ought to
be considered a matter of self-necessity, and is still vanishing from
the present clinical agenda – a culture of following up the patients
who have been treated in the daily practice. Judging the result of
the individual patient’s treatment as thoroughly and comprehen-
sively as possible, and whether there is sufﬁcient cure or relief,
should be part of routine practice. The resulting increase in con-
sultation fees might well be counterbalanced by reduced costs
because of better outcome and less doctor-hopping by the patients.
The medical profession would proﬁt from a further evolution of
the methods and strategies of clinical judgement. As long as the
doctors are, in principle, considered incapable of judging whether
they help their individual patient or not, they will need strict
external guidance. Clinical judgement, and its further develop-
ment, is therefore a key issue for the future destiny of the medical
profession. An advancement of clinical judgement could grant a
renewed cognitive basis for medical expertise and medical profes-
sionalism, and could increase both the intellectual and practical
autonomy of the doctor.
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